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This paper argues that the relation between the currency board and the financial system—i.e., 
the link between money and banking—is essential to understand the 2001-02 Argentine 
crisis.  The establishment of the currency board in 1991 helped develop the Argentine 
financial system.  Despite its strengths, the financial system remained vulnerable to real 
exchange rate misalignments and fiscal shocks.  After 1998, Argentina fell into a currency-
growth-debt trap.  It tried to break away by focusing on growth, but failed to address the 
currency and debt components of the trap, dramatically raising uncertainty.  This unleashed a 
depositor run, which lead to the abandonment of the currency board.  We argue that an early 
exit of the currency board into dollarization would have likely prevented the run and 
substantially lowered the magnitude of the crisis.  Dollarization would have preserved 
property rights and financial intermediation.  Moreover, it would not have necessarily 
implied giving up nominal flexibility altogether, since dollarization could have been followed 
over time by “pesification at the margin.”  
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1.  Introduction and summary 
 
The recent and still developing Argentine crisis has already generated a heated debate 
among proponents of alternative explanations, each emphasizing different factors as the main 
underlying drivers.  Feldstein (2002), for example, argues that the crisis was due to exchange 
rate overvaluation that could not be easily corrected and to an excessive amount of foreign 
debt.  From a different perspective, Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2002) claim that a sudden 
stop in capital flows following the Russia crisis created a major real exchange rate 
misalignment and fiscal problems in Argentina that were difficult to address given the 
country’s widespread currency mismatches, high indebtedness, and relatively closed 
economy.  Perry and Servén (2002) find the origins of the crisis in multiple vulnerabilities 
(deflationary adjustment under the hard peg, high public debt and fiscal fragility, and hidden 
weaknesses in the financial sector), neither of which was decisive by itself.  But all these 
factors reinforced each other in a perverse way under the post-1997 shocks, leading to a 
major overvaluation of the real exchange rate and pessimistic expectations regarding growth 
prospects.  The economy thus entered a vicious circle from which it was very hard to pull 
out, particularly considering rigid and insufficient policy instruments, as well as faulty policy 
decisions.  Mussa (2002), by contrast, emphasizes that, given the decision to adhere to 
convertibility, the post-1997 external shocks (including the appreciation of the U.S. dollar 
and the devaluation of the Brazilian real), and labor market rigidities, the “fundamental cause 
of [the] disaster […] was the chronic inability of the Argentine authorities to run a 
responsible fiscal policy,” which led to a fast rise in the ratio of debt to GDP during the 
1990s and up to the outburst of the crisis. 
 
In this paper we argue that the relation between the currency board and the financial 
system—that is, the link between money and banking—is key to understand the unravelling 
of the Argentine crisis.  In particular, it is crucial to explain the manner in which the crisis 
unfolded, its timing and severity, and the complications in managing and resolving it.  This is 
because the currency board was not just a simple peg but rather a central part of the 
Argentine social contract that enjoyed deep political support, given its success in bringing 
about stability.  Convertibility was also a “core” or “master” contract, in the sense that it 
underpinned a wide range of contracts across the whole economy. 
 
It was clear that, from the point of view of Argentina’s trade and productive structure, 
a rigid peg to the dollar was highly inconvenient.
1  But convertibility was not chosen in view 
of trade considerations.  It arose in response to hyperinflation and against the historical 
background of repeated episodes of debasement of the domestic currency.  As a result, the 
function of money as a store of value (and, hence, the confidence in, and sound functioning 
of, the financial system) as well the contracting function in the economy (and not just in 
regard of financial contracts) became inextricably intertwined with convertibility.  A 
                                                 
1 Argentina is subject to different shocks than the U.S. and thus it does not share with the U.S. an optimum 
currency area.  In addition, Argentina has a substantial share of its foreign trade with countries whose currencies 
fluctuate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar.  Also, Argentina is a relatively closed economy with a large non-tradable 
sector; hence, it could potentially benefit much more (compared to very open economies with relatively small 
non-tradable sectors) from being able to change its nominal exchange rate to deal—through “expenditure 
switching” effects—with misalignments in the relative price of tradables to non-tradables.    2
disorderly break with the 10-year peg to the U.S. dollar was bound to have important 
implications on the banking system, debt markets, labor markets, and price setting more 
generally.  It should therefore not be surprising that no government since 1991 had incentives 
to exit convertibility by breaking away from the one-peso-one-dollar commitment.  It was 
also natural that, against this background, the particular way in which Argentina exited from 
convertibility in search for greater price and fiscal flexibility was to be an issue of paramount 
importance.   
 
The currency regime and its connection with the financial system are essential to 
understand not only the crisis in Argentina but also the pre-crisis rapid growth and 
strengthening of the financial system, as discussed in Calomiris and Powell (2001).  The 
decision of the government to peg the peso to the US dollar through a currency board in 1991 
set into motion a process of rapid financial deepening.  The currency and bank run unleashed 
by the Tequila (Mexican) crisis in 1995 underscored the need for greater capital strength and 
liquidity in the Argentine banking system, given the limits imposed by the currency board on 
the central bank to act as lender of last resort.  To overcome those limitations, Argentina 
introduced banking system reforms quickly and effectively.  The result was an 
internationalized and much more resilient banking system that became highly regarded 
worldwide.  By the end of the decade, the system was, in the eyes of most analysts and 
despite the effects of the post-1997 recession on debtor capacity to pay, still sufficiently 
liquid and capitalized to withstand a significant range of shocks without endangering 
convertibility.   
 
Nonetheless, the banking system had some important hidden weaknesses that 
undermined its capacity to deal with certain types of shocks, even under scenarios where the 
one-peso-one-dollar convertibility arrangement was maintained.  First, it lacked prudential 
norms explicitly designed to address the adverse effects on the capacity to pay of the non-
tradable sector of a major adjustment in the real exchange rate towards a more depreciated 
equilibrium level.  In the absence of a nominal devaluation, such an adjustment had to take 
place through (slow) nominal deflation and unemployment.  Second, the financial system 
became significantly and increasingly exposed to the public sector and thus vulnerable to a 
sovereign debt crisis.  Third, the liquidity safeguards for the banking system, which were by 
design available to any depositor on a first come first served basis, proved inadequate to 
protect the payments system in the context of a depositor run.  
 
A series of external shocks, including the Brazilian crisis and the appreciation of the 
US dollar vis-à-vis most currencies, as well as high fiscal spending during boom years, set 
the economy into a currency-growth-debt (CGD) trap by 1999.  The currency became 
substantially overvalued, growth stagnant and, as a result, the public debt hard to service, 
feeding back into the perceived overvaluation through the gradual closure of international 
markets.  The new government that assumed power in December 1999 tried to break free 
from the CGD trap mainly by reviving growth indirectly, through a tax-based fiscal 
adjustment and consequent confidence effects.  It complemented fiscal adjustment with labor 
flexibility measures to overcome the exchange rate overvaluation, and with a new, IMF-
supported international package to refinance the debt.  However, labor flexibility did not 
materialize, the fiscal package had a deleterious effect on growth, the debt became  3
unsustainable, and there was a run on the currency and bank deposits.  Policies taken after 
April 2001, when Mr. Cavallo became economy minister, also failed to revive growth.   
Instead, they dramatically raised uncertainty about the C and D legs of the trap, eventually 
leading to a depositor run, the “corralito” (deposit freeze), changes in presidents, a default on 
the government debt, and the abandonment of the currency board into floating.
2  These 
changes came with a massive destruction of property rights through the forcible (asymmetric) 
stock pesification. 
 
We argue that an early (i.e., before 2001) exit of the currency board into formal 
dollarization would have probably prevented a run on the banks and the collapse of the 
financial sector.  By contrast, the exit from convertibility via “stock pesification cum float”—
i.e., the forcible conversion of dollar-denominated domestic contracts into peso-denominated 
ones, followed by the abandonment of the peg—was the most disorderly exit alternative.  It 
largely explains why a crisis was turned into the unparalleled catastrophe we are now 
witnessing.  The exit via stock pesification cum float was bound to ignite a run and require, 
as it in fact did, a freeze and/or the securitization of bank deposits.  To be sure, while 
substantially lowering the probability of a systemic bank run, dollarization would have not 
spared debtors in the non-tradable sector from the deflation-induced erosion of their capacity 
to pay.  It would thus have entailed loan quality decay and the associated banking system 
stress and restructuring needs.  Moreover, though dollarization would have been beneficial to 
the financial sector, it remains to be determined whether it would have been beneficial to 
long-run growth. 
 
We also argue that formal dollarization would have had to be followed over time by 
the introduction of greater flexibility, including though “pesification at the margin.”  That is, 
via the establishment of a new currency for transaction purposes, either by exploiting and 
shepherding the spontaneous emergence of a domestic currency under pressure (as the 
“patacón” in fact arose) or by introducing a new currency by design.  The dollar would have 
remained as the main currency of denomination for financial contracts.  Pesification at the 
margin is theoretically and empirically underpinned by the distinction between money as a 
store of value and as means of payment, which implies that financial dollarization admits a 
domestic currency for transactions.  Appropriately managed, this bi-monetary system (dollar 
for savings, peso for transactions) can provide an emerging economy with a degree of 
flexibility to adjust fiscal spending to income and correct misalignments in the relative price 
of tradables to non-tradables.  At the same time, this system can foster sustainable deepening 
in financial intermediation, provided that appropriate institutional and prudential innovations 
are introduced to deal with the specific risks in a dollarized financial system. 
 
The option to dollarize became much more difficult for Argentina in 2001, when 
confidence collapsed, access to international financial markets shrank, the financial sector 
became more vulnerable to a government default, and deposits fled the system.  It also 
became more difficult politically, as the government linked the peso to both the dollar and 
the euro.  However, even in the more complex post-April 2001 context, it can be argued that 
                                                 
2 The name “corralito” (little fence in Spanish) for the deposit freeze was initially adopted because deposits 
could be used freely inside the financial system but could not leave the system.  Several modifications to the 
corralito followed; for example, the forcible reprogramming time deposits.  4
dollarization was still a better bet compared to forcible pesification of financial contracts, as 
the latter obliterates the function of money as a store of value with deleterious effects on 
financial intermediation.  
 
An important caveat is that many of the arguments in our paper stem from the 
analysis of the counterfactual, that is, of what would have happened if Argentina had adopted 
different policies before the crisis erupted.  By nature, this type of analysis is very difficult to 
back with real data and hard to prove.  Nevertheless, we believe that a serious consideration 
of the different arguments presented in the paper may help to draw relevant policy lessons for 
the future, particularly for countries with highly dollarized financial systems. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly describes the 
evolution of the Argentine financial sector during the 1990s.  Section 3 analyzes the hidden 
weaknesses in the financial sector.  Section 4 describes the government strategy up to the 
crisis.  Section 5 assesses the options of pesification cum float and dollarization.  Section 6 
discusses the notion of pesification at the margin.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Convertibility-compatible banking system 
 
Convertibility, i.e., the legal and institutional monetary arrangements to ensure a one 
to one relation of the peso to the dollar, was introduced in Argentina in April 1991.  Out of 
the ashes left by the hyperinflation, the one-peso-one-dollar rule quickly restored the function 
of money as a store of value and bank deposits grew steeply.
3  The sustainability of its early 
successes (manifested by a rapid taming of hyperinflation, a wave of optimistic capital 
inflows, and a vigorous resumption of growth) was transitorily but severely questioned 
during the Tequila contagion of 1995, when bank deposits fell by nearly 20 percent in a span 
of few weeks, nearly bringing down the financial system and convertibility with it.   
 
The Tequila marked a turning point.  The authorities responded by affirming 
convertibility as a central component of the social contract, while recognizing that its 
viability required a particularly resilient financial system.  They launched a series of 
ambitious reforms to give effect to this conviction, as illustrated in Box 1.  The results were 
impressive (see Table 1).  So much that by 1998 Argentina ranked second (after Singapore, 
tied with Hong Kong, and ahead of Chile) in terms of the quality of its regulatory 
environment, according to the CAMELOT rating system developed by the World Bank (see 
Table 2).
4  By the end of the 1990s, a resilient banking system was the crown jewel of 
convertibility-induced reform.  Convertibility did not lead to strong fiscal institutions, but 
few doubted that it had led to a shock-resistant banking sector.  
                                                 
3 After having increased between 1991 and 1994, banks deposits continued rising from 17 percent of GDP by 
the end of 1994 to 26 by the end of 1998. 
4 The CAMELOT index combined separate rankings for capital requirements (C); loan loss provisioning 
requirements and definition of past-due loans (A); management (M), defined by the extent of high-quality 
foreign bank presence; liquidity requirements (L); operating environment (O) as measured by rankings with 
respect to property rights, creditor rights, and enforcement; and transparency (T), as measured by whether banks 
are rated by international risk rating agencies and by an index on corruption.  Argentina ranked 1 for C (tied 
with Singapore), 4 for A, 3 for M, 4 for L, 7 for O, and 2 for T.  For further discussion see World Bank (1998), 
pp. 39-61 and Appendix A.   5
 
The banking system was arguably in a very solid position by 1998, before the 
Brazilian devaluation of January 1999, and was still reasonably healthy through the end of 
2000, despite the post-1998 continued economic contraction.  In effect, common indicators 
of financial health, shown in Table 3, depict a well capitalized, strongly provisioned, and 
highly liquid banking system through the year 2000, although a system experiencing losses 
and increasingly burdened by bad loans after 1998.
5   
 
Convertibility became a central piece in the social contract and post-1994 reforms had 
created a banking system that, though costly, appeared convertibility-compatible in most 
respects.  Towards the end of the decade, the system’s prudential buffers were sufficient to 
withstand sizeable liquidity and solvency shocks—including a flight of about one-third of the 
system’s deposits as well as a sudden (additional) default in up to 10 percent of the loan 
portfolio—without endangering the convertibility system.
6  The important presence of 
reputable foreign banks (they accounted for over 70 percent of total banking assets in 2000, 
as shown in Table 1) was broadly perceived to implicitly augment these liquidity and 
solvency cushions.  These banks were expected to stand behind the capital and liquidity of 
their affiliates in Argentina, at least in the context of bad states of the world associated with 
bad luck.  (Few were thinking then of bad states of the world caused directly by confiscatory 
government policy.) 
 
The system’s buffers were, of course, not sufficient to confront a major catastrophe.  
In Argentina, the disorderly breakdown of the one to one correspondence between the peso 
and the dollar qualified as a catastrophe.  As the policy intent was to reinforce the viability of 
convertibility, it made no sense for the authorities to issue prudential norms that would 
dissuade the use of the dollar in financial contracts per se.  The mantra of the system was “no 
more than one peso for one dollar, forever.”  To be sure, the markets did not take this mantra 
completely to heart—the peso problem continued throughout the 1990s, spiking during 
turbulent times (Figure 1).  But the authorities could not signal the possibility of a nominal 
devaluation through prudential norms without undermining their own quest to raise the 
credibility of convertibility above all doubts.  It was thus no secret that the disorderly 
breakdown of the one-peso-one-dollar rule would wreck the banking system. 
 
3.  Hidden prudential weaknesses given the commitment to convertibility 
 
Assessing the strength of the Argentine banking system vis-à-vis a catastrophic 
departure from the one-peso-one-dollar social contract is in our view not productive.  No 
financial system in the world is build to withstand major catastrophes of comparable 
magnitude.  The strength of the Argentine system should rather be assessed in terms of its 
                                                 
5 Profits turned negative already in 1998 and became deeply negative during 1999-2000 mainly because of the 
need to constitute provisions in the face of rising bad loans.  NPLs rose to 10.2 percent of total loans in 2000, 
from 7.1 percent the year earlier, and the increase in provisions started to lag behind (Table 3). 
6 Table 3 puts systemic core liquidity (disposable international reserves of the central bank plus foreign 
exchange in cash or near-cash held abroad by banks) at about 38 percent of banking system deposits at end-
2000.  However, there was a significant variance in the distribution of such liquidity across banks.  This may 
explain why the “corralito” was imposed at the end of 2001 before deposits had fallen by 30 percent.    6
capacity to resist a reasonably wide range of shocks without endangering convertibility.   
How did it measure against this standard?  As it turns out, not completely well. 
 
Empowered by hindsight we can now identify at least three crucial weaknesses in the 
regulatory framework.  These shortcomings are identified through fair play—i.e., by taking 
as given the rules of the convertibility game.  The shortcomings relate to the following items. 
 
(i)  The link between debtor capacity to pay and the deflationary adjustment to a 
more depreciated equilibrium real exchange rate.  
(ii)  The growing exposure of the banking system to government default. 
(iii)  The insufficient realization that general liquidity buffers do not fully protect 
the payment system from a run. 
 
The first prudential shortcoming has to do with credit risk—the latent non-performing 
loans (NPLs) in the context of a misalignment of the real exchange rate (RER) relative to a 
more depreciated equilibrium level.  Convertibility (or formal dollarization), as Roubini 
(2001) has correctly stressed, does not immunize a country from the balance sheet effects of 
a RER adjustment.
7  In particular, RER overvaluation is corrected under convertibility (or 
dollarization) slowly, through painful deflation and unemployment (particularly if rigidities 
in the labor market are significant), which certainly erodes the capacity to pay of debtors 
whose earnings come from the non-tradable sector.
8  Under the one-peso-one-dollar rule, this 
happens regardless of whether the loans in question are denominated in dollars or in pesos.   
 
Hence, the first prudential shortcoming had much less to do with the failure to single 
out the currency of loan denomination and much more with the failure to recognize the 
special risk of loans to debtors in the non-tradable sector—a credit risk that would 
materialize in the event of significant adverse shocks that led to a deflationary adjustment.  
Taking the one-peso-one-dollar rule as a given, it would have been advisable for the 
authorities to establish tougher loan classification criteria, higher loan-loss provisioning 
rules, and possibly also a higher weight for the purposes of measuring capital requirements 
for loans to the non-tradable sector, regardless of whether the loans were peso- or dollar-
denominated.
9 
                                                 
7 It has to be noted that this shortcoming is not specific of a currency board but rather a consequence of 
financial dollarization, itself a manifestation of a weak domestic currency that leads to a de facto dollarization 
of financial assets. See De la Torre, Levy Yeyati, and Schmukler (2002) for a discussion along these lines. 
8 Deflationary adjustment in a currency-board (or dollarized) country lowers the value of non-tradable income 
in terms of tradables, which implies that the burden of the debt rises (capacity to pay falls) for the non-tradable 
sector.  By contrast, in a country with a flexible exchange rate (i.e., where a fixed parity is not part of the social 
contract) and without a liability dollarization problem, the adjustment to a more depreciated equilibrium RER 
would come through nominal depreciation, which would be associated with an improvement (via debt dilution) 
in the capacity to pay of debtors in the non-tradable sector.  
9 Given that information asymmetry problems in buoyant times lead to rising bank exposure to the non-tradable 
sector without adequate internalization of risks, a system of counter-cyclical loan-loss provisioning 
requirements, like the one established at end-1999 by the Bank of Spain (Circular No. 9/1999 of December 17, 
1999), could have been adapted in Argentina to address risks in loans to the non-tradable sector.  The Spanish 
system requires a buildup of counter-cyclical provisions in good times (thereby curbing excessive dividend 
distributions in good times), which are shifted into specific provisions in bad times (without passing through the 
income statement) as the loan portfolio decays.   7
 
The second prudential shortcoming also has to do with credit risk.  It consisted in the 
failure to isolate the solvency of the banking system from the solvency of the government.  
No matter how credible, a currency board (or dollarization) per se does not create fiscal 
discipline.
10  To the extent that banks hold claims on the domestic government, a fiscal and 
public debt crisis would immediately affect banking system solvency.  However, one silver 
lining of convertibility (or dollarization) is that, in principle, it makes it possible to protect 
banking intermediation from the vagaries of the fiscal process, including an event of 
government debt default, as long as banks are not significantly exposed to domestic 
government risk.  The reason is that the store of value that underpins financial intermediation 
in a currency board (or dollarized) country is ultimately the dollar, whose quality does not 
depend directly on the solvency of the domestic government.
11  This feature should have 
been harnessed in Argentina through prudential norms, all the more considering the country’s 
recurrent fiscal problems.  As described in Box 1, the authorities moved in this direction 
belatedly, in 2000, when they introduced mark-to-market requirements for government bond 
holdings and established a positive weight for loans to the government for the purposes of 
determining capital requirements.  It would have been advisable to take this approach more 
aggressively and much earlier in the decade, and to complement it by limiting the amount of 
government debt that could count as part of the assets eligible to meet bank liquidity 
requirements.  
 
Instead, the persistent fiscal deficit accelerated the placement of domestic debt with 
local banks as other sources of financing gradually run out.  As Figure 2 illustrates, growing 
financing needs were met in the first half of the 1990s by recourse to the sale of state-owned 
assets and, when this source dried up, by borrowing in international capital markets.   
However, after the Tequila crisis, the government started to resort to domestic savings, 
notably pension funds and local banks, which steadily increased their share up to 2001 when, 
after the closure of international markets, they represented the main source of funds after 
multilateral organizations. In the process, the solvency of domestic financial institutions was 
compromised.  The increasing reliance of public finances on domestic markets was not 
restricted to the federal government. As Figure 3 shows, a similar profile emerges in the case 
of the province of Buenos Aires, by far the largest in economic terms. 
 
The third vulnerability and prudential regulation shortcoming relates to the 
insufficient realization by some analysts that general liquidity safeguards, even if high, do 
not adequately protect the payments system from a run.  To be sure, high liquidity 
requirements, as those in effect in Argentina during the second half of the 1990s, enhance the 
resiliency of the banking system—they cushion the system vis-à-vis liquidity shocks and 
deter runs, thereby, reducing the scope for multiple equilibria.  Thanks to its liquidity 
requirements, the Argentine banking system withstood a prolonged and severe process of 
deposit withdrawal during 2001.  At the same time, however, the Argentine experience 
shows that once a run is underway, relaxing liquid reserve requirements can have adverse 
signaling effects that exacerbate the attack on the peso (instead of spurring credit growth as 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Levy Yeyati (2001) or, for the case of Panamá, Goldfajn and Olivares (2000). 
11 In contrast, this condition cannot be obtained where the store of value is the domestic currency.  8
Minister Cavallo hoped for), further weakening confidence.
12  Moreover, Argentina 
illustrates that, as confidence collapses, a general liquidity requirement (available to all 
deposits on a first come first served basis) fails to protect the payment system.
13   
 
The lesson is sobering.  In the absence of a credible lender of last resort, the payment 
system is vulnerable and can collapse under a run, even where liquidity is high but still a 
fraction of deposits and where liquidity is equally available to pay any deposit withdrawal.  It 
thus would appear that, under a currency board and formal dollarization, the protection of the 
payment system from bank runs might actually require some form of a narrow-banking 
structure.  That is, a structure where there is full liquidity backing for transaction balances 
(demand deposits).  Liquidity would be earmarked to these balances and thus able to preserve 
the functioning of the payment system (and avoid deposit freezes and interruptions of the 
payment system), even in the extreme scenario where banks are unable to honor withdrawals 
of time deposits. 
 
4.  The government half-blind strategy up to the crisis 
 
Right from the beginning, the De la Rúa administration (which assumed power in 
December 1999) was caught in a currency-growth-debt (CGD) trap.  The currency was 
overvalued, growth was faltering, and the debt was hard to service.  This trap was in no small 
part due to major external shocks.  The Argentine peso appreciated sharply relative to most 
trading partners in tandem with the revaluation of the US dollar vis-à-vis European and 
emerging market currencies (particularly the Brazilian real).  It is estimated that, by the year 
2000, the Argentine RER was overvalued by about 50 percent.
14  The debt-to-GDP ratio was 
on the rise and, measured at the equilibrium real exchange rate, it was soaring.
15  T h e  
unyielding economic recession and rising unemployment fed pessimistic expectations 
regarding future growth and fiscal revenues, which in turn exacerbated the perception of a 
potentially explosive debt trajectory.  Capital flows came to a sharp halt (not a purely 
exogenous phenomenon
16) and this, together with doubts about fiscal viability, was reflected 
in sharp increases in the marginal cost of capital for Argentina (as measured by the spread of 
Argentine bonds over US Treasury bonds), further weakening growth prospects.  All of this 
fed doubts about the sustainability of the one-peso-one-dollar commitment.  In the absence of 
clear policy direction and convincing policy implementation, the elements of the CGD trap 
were easily liable to fall into a vicious circle.   
 
                                                 
12 Many analysts cautioned about the potential negative effects of relaxing liquidity requirements.  In effect, this 
issue was a major cause of dispute between the central bank and the ministry of economy. 
13 For a more detailed discussion on the limits of liquidity requirements, see Caprio, Dooley, Leipziger, and 
Walsh (1996). 
14 Perry and Servén (2002). 
15 Perry and Servén (2002) calculate that, relative to a benchmark analysis of fiscal sustainability, the use of the 
equilibrium RER adds 24 percentage points to the public sector debt to GDP ratio in 2001, and leads to an 
average increase of about two percentage points in the annual primary fiscal surplus required (in 2000-2003) to 
attain inter-temporal fiscal solvency.   
16 Perry and Servén (2002) demonstrate that: (i) during 1999 Argentina was not affected as severely as other 
countries in the Latin American region by the slowdown in capital flows; and (ii) the sharp reversal of capital 
flows to Argentina in 2000-2001 was mainly endogenous to domestic factors.   9
The government’s strategy to break free from the CGD trap focused on reviving 
growth, although the means to achieve this objective changed dramatically after April 2001, 
when Mr. Cavallo took the post of Minister of Economy.  (See Box 2 for a chronology of the 
political and economic events.)  During 2000, growth resumption was sought indirectly—
trying to regain investor confidence through fiscal adjustment, including the “impuestazo” in 
January 2000.  It was hoped that improved confidence would eventually lead to more capital 
inflows and growth, making the debt and current account sustainable.  To be sure, the 
authorities also tried to address the problem of currency overvaluation directly, through some 
flexibilization of labor markets.
17  In addition, as confidence was not restored and growth 
failed to pick up, the authorities shifted their attention towards calming fears of a possible 
debt default.  The December 2000 IMF package (advertised as a US$40 billion package) was 
negotiated with this latter objective prominently in mind.  However, none of these actions 
achieved the expected results and hopes of reviving growth faded away. 
 
Minister Cavallo brought his prestige to attempt the rescue.  Empowered by Congress 
with special powers, he focused on rekindling growth, but this time directly, through 
heterodox measures.  These included imposing a tax on imports and subsidizing exports (a 
fiscal devaluation for trade flows), lowering reserve requirements, and announcing the 
eventual peg of the peso to the dollar and the euro (with equal weights), once these two 
currencies reached parity.  From hindsight, it is clear that the growth-focused strategy, 
particularly in Mr. Cavallo’s heterodox version, was half-blind or naïve.  It not only did not 
yield growth, it also escalated the uncertainty about the two other components of the CGD 
trap, namely the uncertainties about the debt and the currency arrangement.   
 
Doubts about the maintenance of convertibility soared—the one-peso-one-dollar rule 
had already been broken through the back door for trade transactions and it was feared that it 
could be broken also for financial transactions.  In addition, Mr. Cavallo had pushed 
successfully for the resignation of central bank president Pedro Pou, who was viewed by 
investors as a strict guardian of monetary and banking system soundness.  Moreover, Mr. 
Cavallo used his special powers to reform the central bank charter, removing limits on the 
ability of the central bank to inject liquidity, thereby effectively dismantling the money-
issuance rule that underpinned convertibility.
18  Thus, the talk about a “change in the 
convertibility model” escalated dramatically, with high uncertainty as to what would the 
successor model be.  The growing doubts about the maintenance of the one-peso-one-dollar 
rule are illustrated by Figure 1, which shows that the average currency premium increased 
                                                 
17 The approval of the labor market reform was linked to a bribery scandal, in which senators were accused of 
receiving payments from the government to approve the law.  The scandal was unresolved, leading to the 
resignation of vice president Carlos Alvarez.  
18 Prior to the April 2001 amendments to the central bank charter, dollar-denominated, internationally traded 
Argentine government bonds could be treated as part of the country’s disposable international reserves, as long 
as such bonds did not exceed 33 percent of the total.  After the amendments, the claims on the government 
received by the central bank (in repo or as collateral) in the context of its liquidity operations with the banking 
system no longer counted as part of the maximum of 33 percent of disposable international reserves.  Thus, the 
April 2001 amendments effectively enabled unlimited injection of lender of last liquidity without hard dollar 
backing.  In practice, however, the claims on the government that the central bank received as part of its lender 
of last resort activity in 2001 did not exceed the 33 percent limit.  Nevertheless, the amendment is at least partly 
responsible for the increased doubts that the currency board would be maintained.  10
sharply and became highly volatile after April 2001, reaching very high peaks when Mr. 
Cavallo introduced some new measures.  These doubts are also illustrated by Figure 4, which 
shows a post April 2001 pronounced rise in the share of dollar deposits in total deposits.   
 
At the same time, uncertainty about the D component of the CGD trap escalated as 
the government procrastinated in taking a decision on the debt front.  Instead of recognizing 
that debt restructuring was becoming a necessity following the failed attempts to restore 
growth, the government averted debt service arrears by draining the liquidity of the financial 
system.  In April 2001, the government used moral suasion to place US$2 billion of bonds 
with banks in Argentina, allowing banks to use those bonds to meet up to 18 percent of the 
liquidity requirement.  The banking system thus became substantially less liquid and much 
more exposed to a government default.  Total banking system claims on the government rose 
gradually from less than 10 percent of total bank assets at the end of 1994 to 15 percent at the 
end of 2000, jumping to nearly 30 percent by end-2001, as shown in Figure 5.  This, in turn, 
heightened concerns about a potential abandonment of the currency board.  As choices to 
finance the deficit through debt rapidly shrank, the specter of money printing loomed bigger.   
 
In the process, the future of public finances, of the banking system, and of the 
currency became tightly linked.  This link foreshadowed the catastrophe, the unthinkable—a 
disorderly abandonment of the one-peso-one-dollar in an economy with widespread liability 
dollarization (i.e., dollar debts of non-dollar earners).  As a result, the little confidence that 
remained was completely splintered, particularly once it became clear that the government 
had completely lost access to finance and was forced to announce a “zero deficit” target for 
the second half of 2001.  The crisis exploded as investors and depositors ran for the exit, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.  This run forced the corralito and a change in government at the end of 
2001.
19 
 
In sum, as the strategy of reviving growth failed, the government also failed to craft 
an exit strategy for the CGD trap.  Rather, it exacerbated the uncertainty about the C and D 
components of the trap, which precipitated the crisis.  But was the crisis an inevitable 
outcome?  In the next section we argue that an early definition regarding the currency regime 
would have significantly increased the chances of avoiding a financial meltdown of the kind 
that occurred.  Such an early definition would have at least reduced the trap to a GD trap and 
probably could have forestalled the run on the banking system.  
 
5.  Pesify or dollarize? 
 
To address the C component of the CGD trap, the government could in principle have 
moved in either one of two directions: (i) float cum stock pesification or (ii) dollarization. 
 
Due to widespread balance sheet mismatches (dollar debts of non-dollar earners), 
exiting convertibility by floating required the prior pesification of existing domestic financial 
contracts by decree (stock pesification).  Without prior stock pesification, a significant and 
                                                 
19 The fact that the imminence of the crisis lasted several months made the crisis worse because depositors 
(mostly large and informed ones) had time to withdraw around 18 percent of the deposits, leaving only small 
depositors in the system.  11
discrete devaluation would have immediately wrecked debtors in the non-tradable sector and, 
hence, the banking system.
20  Stock pesification and float was indeed one way to address the 
C component of the CGD trap.  It was the alternative chosen by the Argentine government 
under pressure at the beginning of 2002, and its destructive power is now evident.
21   
 
Was stock pesification cum float a feasible alternative for earlier, more tranquil 
times?  Would it have been less destructive then?  We have serious doubts that there is an 
affirmative answer to these questions.  To start with, forcible stock pesification cum float 
necessarily implied a departure from the one-peso-one-dollar rule, a central piece of the 
Argentina social contract.  This was a “core” or “master” contract that underpinned a wide 
array of contracts throughout the economy, sustained the function of money as store of value 
(on which financial intermediation hinged), and commanded deep political support.  No 
government had an incentive to implement such a departure in tranquil times.  Forcible 
pesification cum float was therefore a feasible alternative only for turbulent times.  And it 
was an alternative that almost by necessity had to be implemented in the context of a change 
in government.  In addition, the arbitrary and massive destruction of property rights implied 
in stock pesification meant that any anticipation of it would have triggered a run.  Hence, 
stock pesification cum float would have required the simultaneous establishment of a deposit 
freeze or securitization as well as widespread capital controls in order to keep depositors and 
investors from fleeing.
22 
 
The Argentine experience illustrates that the destructive power of stock pesification 
goes well beyond the (hopefully transitory) disruption of the payments system.  It obliterates 
the function of money as a store of value, on which financial intermediation hinges.  Deposits 
were also frozen during the Ecuadorian crisis of 1999 and the payment system severely 
disrupted, but deposits were not pesified, and this contributed to a quick regeneration of 
financial intermediation once formal dollarization established the dollar as the store of value.  
The forcible pesification of domestic financial contracts in Argentina, by contrast, was a 
desperate attempt to escape what Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) call the “original sin” 
by committing a graver sin—the murder of money as store of value.
23  Pesified Argentina 
now waits for a sort of miracle, that is, the resurrection of the peso as a store of value and, 
with it, the regeneration of financial intermediation. 
 
                                                 
20 Ecuador’s 1999 crisis illustrates the dire consequences of floating in the context of a weak fiscal position and 
widespread currency mismatches (dollar debts of non-dollar earners).  The crisis deepened dramatically as 
nominal devaluation and debtor insolvency were caught in a feedback loop.  See De la Torre, García-Saltos, and 
Mascaró (2002). 
21 In early 2002 Argentina stock pesified asymmetrically.  In particular, bank loans were pesified at 1:1 and 
deposits at 1:1.4.  On impact, this decision transferred part of the mismatch in the balance sheets of debtors in 
the non-tradable sector to the balance sheets of banks, resulting in less losses than otherwise to depositors.   
22 A negotiated restructuring of government and corporate debts to foreigners appears inescapable under stock 
pesification.  This is because a significant part of Argentine corporate debt and most of the government debt 
was in dollars and subject to foreign jurisdictions, so it could not be forcibly “pesified.” 
23 As defined by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) the “original sin” refers to the condition of a country that 
has a weak currency, defined by the inability of issuing peso debt in international markets.  As a result, such 
country is tragically trapped between currency mismatches (it can only issue long-term debt in dollars) and 
maturity mismatches (local markets only accept short-duration peso debt).    12
In sum, stock pesification cum float was arguably: (i) not an alternative that could 
have been feasibly implemented in tranquil times or without a change of government; (ii) an 
alternative that would have in any case provoked a run, requiring a deposit freeze of some 
form; and (iii) a deleterious alternative for financial intermediation.  All these reasons lead us 
to believe that stock pesification was the least desirable and feasible alternative.   
 
Was dollarization then a better option?  The previous arguments, in sharp contrast 
with a number of other analysts,
24 support the view that dollarization was indeed a superior 
alternative.
25  To be sure, dollarization would have not averted the slow deflationary 
adjustment to the more depreciated equilibrium real exchange rate, with consequent capacity 
to pay problems and defaults among dollar debtors with incomes in the non-tradable sector 
(namely, the government and part of the private sector).  The move towards dollarization 
would have, thus, not spared Argentina from significant banking system stress and even 
some individual bank failures.  However, debtors in the non-tradable sector and creditor 
banks would have had time to adjust and the adjustment process would not have necessarily 
triggered in a run. 
 
In addition, dollarization would have been consistent with the Argentine social 
contract based on the long-term commitment to one-peso-one-dollar, with salutary 
implications for depositor confidence and even for political viability.  Depositor confidence 
would have been boosted not just because the perceived risk of deposit confiscation would 
have been dimmed significantly, but also because the option-value of foreign bank access to 
their parent’s capital and liquidity would have been better protected.  That is, even if a run 
would have occurred, foreign banks would have likely been more willing to stand behind 
their Argentine affiliates, compared to the current situation marked by confiscatory (and 
asymmetric) stock pesification. 
 
Dollarization, though clearly not easy politically, would have arguably been within 
the scope of the government in power inasmuch as it respected the one-peso-one-dollar rule.  
In this sense, there is an asymmetry in the political economy of dollarization versus stock 
pesification.  It is generally less costly politically for developing-country governments to 
maintain an exchange rate parity than to break it.  That is why pegs tend to be abandoned 
during crisis times.  This argument is a fortiori stronger in the case of Argentina, given the 
crucial relevance of the currency board to the operation of the financial system. 
 
The dollarization alternative had been considered by the Argentine government in 
1999-2000, but lost ground afterwards partly due to political polarization.  (It was construed 
as a symbol of support to Mr. Menem.)  By contrast, against a background of continued 
recession and increasing RER overvaluation, the proposal of stock pesification cum float 
gained ground.
26  Indeed, the feasibility and potentially salutary effects on depositor 
                                                 
24 See, for example, Roubini (2001) and Hausmann (2001). 
25 Advocates of this view include, among others, Dornbusch (2001), Calvo (2002). 
26 It in fact became somewhat popular in academic and policy circles after Prof. Hausmann’s public 
recommendation to Argentina (first presented in the October 2001 Latin American and the Caribbean Economic 
Association Meetings in Montevideo) to “pesify” all financial contracts, index them to the consumer price 
index, and then let the peso float freely (Hausmann 2001).  This proposal failed to anticipate that it would  13
confidence of dollarization narrowed during 2001, but did not disappear.  A run became more 
likely once the liquidity of the financial system had been raided (causing a significant step 
increase in banks’ exposure to the government) and once the government was clearly headed 
towards default in the context of no access to capital markets.
27  A default on the government 
debt in such circumstances would have made depositors skittish, and a run was a distinct 
possibility, but not a necessity.  
 
Why was a run less likely under dollarization even in 2001?  Any answer to this 
question is, of course, highly speculative.  Nonetheless, we are inclined to believe that the 
answer is a cautious yes.  This is in part because, while deposit withdrawals in 2001 were 
probably motivated by heterogeneous expectations, much of the depositor activity appears to 
have reflected fears of a nominal devaluation.  Some depositors feared a freeze on deposits or 
pesification, therefore withdrawing deposits from the banking system.  But others, fearing a 
devaluation, just withdrew their peso deposits or converted them into dollar deposits.  In 
effect, in the months leading to the explosion of the crisis the share of dollar deposits soared, 
as depositors withdrew more peso deposits than dollar deposits from banks and the currency 
premium increased (Figure 4).  Moreover, a run would have been less likely (or less 
pronounced) under dollarization to the extent that depositors believed that the currency 
would overshoot once floated.  
 
The cautious presumption of no run under dollarization, even in the face of a default 
in government debt, appears not unreasonable in light of Ecuador’s experience.  In Ecuador, 
the sole announcement of dollarization in January 2000 (formal dollarization was put into 
law only in March 2000) stopped the depositor run on its tracks and quickly reverted it.  This 
happened even though the Ecuadorian government was in open default (the debt restructuring 
agreement was signed several months after the dollarization announcement), most banks 
were highly exposed to the government, and it was no secret that many of the large banks 
were completely insolvent.  There is no obvious reason to believe that developments would 
have been different in Argentina following dollarization, particularly considering that the 
Argentine banking system was unquestionably in a substantially better shape than Ecuador’s.  
Moreover, to reinforce the stabilizing effects of dollarization on depositor behavior, 
Argentina could have taken additional positive steps to relax the link between banking 
system solvency and fiscal solvency.
28 
 
In all, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, from the point of view of preserving 
healthy links between money and banking, the more obvious non-traumatic strategy to break 
free from the CGD trap would have included an early dollarization.  This exit strategy would 
have been easier to implement at the time when Argentina still had some access to 
international financial markets and before Mr. Cavallo announced the inclusion of the euro in 
the peso peg, thereby fueling currency uncertainty to very high levels (Figure 1).
29  A 
                                                                                                                                                       
inevitably lead to a deposit freeze.  The proposal, moreover, seriously underestimated the difficulty of 
establishing the peso as a store of value in order to re-generate financial intermediation going forward. 
27 The failure to secure debt rollover in July 2001 was probably the threshold. 
28 A decree passed in 2001 (Presidential Decree 1005) to enable the use of the amounts falling due in the 
government debt to pay taxes would have helped in this regard.  
29 For a detailed chronology of the impact of political and economic announcements on the currency premium, 
see Schmukler and Servén (2002).  14
relatively early decision to dollarize would have better enabled the government to obtain 
international financial support to guarantee the continued functioning of the financial system.  
Dollarization while capital markets were not completely closed to Argentina could have even 
prevented a default on government debt.  Though painfully, the banking system could have 
absorbed over time the losses associated with rising NPLs as the real exchange rate adjusted 
towards equilibrium through deflation. 
 
However, a move to dollarization would have needed to be complemented by other 
factors, given the inconsistency between the peg to the dollar and Argentina’s trade and 
productive structure (see footnote 1 above), and the limits to fiscal adjustment in a 
recessionary context.  Initially, the main function of dollarization would have been to 
stabilize the financial system and stem the run.  Over time, however, the premium of 
introducing some nominal flexibility would have risen.  As a result, dollarization would have 
been increasingly considered as only one step towards building what we elsewhere call a 
viable “dollar trinity,” which combines the dollar as the store of value, with increasing price 
flexibility, and sound institutions (De la Torre, Levy Yeyati, and Schmukler 2002). 
 
6.  Dollarization, nominal flexibility, and pesification at the margin 
 
From the previous discussion it follows that dollarization was the best available 
alternative provided that it would have been followed over time by greater nominal 
flexibility.  In this section, we argue that the needed flexibility could have been gained by 
“pesification at the margin”—i.e., the introduction of a new domestic currency for 
transactions purposes either spontaneously or by design—in contrast with the typical 
dollarization argument that assumes that flexibility is achieved naturally over time.
30  
 
Dollarization advocates typically downplay some important aspects related to the 
success of the dollarization avenue, or simply state them as obvious preconditions.
31  In 
particular, they acknowledge the need for greater nominal flexibility in light of the 
limitations imposed by the loss of the exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism, and the 
need of fiscal discipline consistent with the loss of the inflation tax.  Moreover, they often 
advertise dollarization as an irrevocable decision that, inasmuch as it restricts monetary 
financing of the budget, can help foster fiscal discipline, inducing governments to adjust 
nominal fiscal spending more flexibly. 
 
This latter view is naïve and ultimately wrong, as the Argentine experience illustrates. 
To start with, nominal flexibility in fiscal spending is seldom verified in practice (in either 
emerging or industrial economies). Political realities severely constrain the margin to reduce 
nominal fiscal expenditure, especially in the context of a recession.  This was decisive factor 
                                                 
30 Roubini (2001), for instance, argues that “as dollarization at the current parity does not prevent the balance 
sheet effects from occurring over time and it does not even solve the short-run competitiveness problem while is 
has also undesirable long-run consequences, it is the least desirable alternative.”  Our argument stresses that 
pesification at the margin could avoid the disastrous effects on financial intermediation of a sharp devaluation 
(understated by Roubini) while enabling a degree of nominal adjustment to deal with RER overvaluation. 
31 Quoting Calvo (2002), hard pegs (of which dollarization is an example) have “to be supplemented by 
adequate institutions and regulatory conditions. For example, it is essential that government wages and 
regulated prices show a high degree of flexibility.”  15
in the evolution of the Argentine CGD trap (see above). Nominal adjustment of the budget 
was achieved only to a limited extent at the expense of a protracted recession that in the end 
made the external debt unsustainable.  The reduction in public expenditure that should have 
accompanied the curtailment of access to external financing did not go beyond an insufficient 
and politically costly wage cut never meant to be permanent.
32  
 
As a result, the restriction on monetary financing of the deficit was eventually 
violated through a somewhat compulsory placing of domestic debt and, ultimately, through 
the issuance of public and provincial paper that differed from currency only cosmetically.  As 
Figure 2 shows, once the funding capacity of the domestic markets was exhausted, the 
government resorted to the issuance of small-denomination federal bonds (Lecop) 
redeemable for federal tax payments, in a failed attempt to preserve the printing restrictions 
imposed by the currency board.  Similarly, in the case of the province of Buenos Aires, 
financing needs exceeding local revenues and federal transfers were eventually met by the 
placement of provincial bonds in domestic markets and the launch of the province’s own 
small denomination paper, the patacón (Figure 3).  Thus, the persistent fiscal imbalance, far 
from adjusting to the budget constraint imposed by the monetary regime, de facto 
circumvented it, rendering the regime all but a formal arrangement. 
 
In fact, the previous charts understate the surge of local money printing. As Table 4 
indicates, a number of other provinces adopted similar mechanisms to finance their deficits, 
and, as a result, the total stock of these quasi-monies reached more than 2,600 millions of 
Argentine pesos or about 23 percent of total pesos in circulation by the end of December 
2001, and had already doubled by the end of March 2002. 
 
Two lessons can be drawn from this evidence.  Firstly, there are perils in imposing a 
hard budget constraint when the government is incapable of squaring its fiscal accounts in the 
short run.  One key peril is the spillover of fiscal problems into the financial system.  As 
noted earlier, on its way towards outright monetary financing of its budget, the Argentine 
government dramatically increased the exposure of the banking sector to fiscal default. 
 
Secondly, the convertibility law was easier to sidestep than originally believed.  This 
is apparent from the ease with which the Argentine government in need of funds resorted to 
money printing with another name.  It is easy to see that the same could have happened under 
dollarization.  Dollarization per se would not have overcome the CGD trap as long as the 
fiscal imbalance was a given (at least in the short term) and not easily reversed by a reduction 
in nominal public expenditures.  Dollarization too would have likely been accompanied by a 
proliferation of local quasi-monies that would have reflected the simple fact that a fiscal 
deficit cannot be eliminated merely by a monetary arrangement.  Quasi-monies more than a 
problem in themselves are, therefore, a symptom of a deep inconsistency between a strict 
monetary framework and the nominal rigidities that this framework cannot magically 
eliminate.   
                                                 
32 Public sector wages and contracts in the federal government were cut by 13 percent in the second semester of 
2001, but the reduction could not be extended to provincial workers. Moreover, although the cuts were meant to 
adjust endogenously in order to meet the zero deficit rule, further reductions were judged to be politically 
unfeasible and were never implemented.  16
 
Indeed, not only did the recourse to printing quasi-monies relaxed the cash flow 
constraints faced by the public sector, but it also worked as an adjustment mechanism for the 
private sector, which rapidly embraced the new bills as an instrument to reduce labor costs 
circumventing labor market rigidities.  However, the fact that most of these quasi-monies 
were accepted for tax payments at face value, coupled with the convertibility of the peso in 
which they were denominated, limited the amount of nominal flexibility that could be 
achieved through its use to a secondary market discount that never exceeded 10 percent.
33 
 
In the previous section we argued that dollarization would have been a better option 
to stem the depositor run and deal with the C component of the CGD trap in Argentina.  But 
dollarization, of itself, would not have led to nominal flexibility in fiscal spending and could 
have been highly inconvenient—and possibly unsustainable—at a time when a large 
adjustment in the real exchange rate to a more depreciated equilibrium level was required.  
However, dollarization does not necessarily imply that there is no partial way out of the 
greenback (as discussed in Levy Yeyati and Schmukler 2001). 
 
This partial way out would typically take place through pesification at the margin, as 
was already occurring in Argentina, albeit in a disorderly manner, through the issuance of 
quasi-monies.  That is, following the formal dollarization of existing financial contracts, 
partial “de-dollarization” could materialize in practice by exploiting and giving order to the 
spontaneous emergence of quasi-monies (such as the Lecop and patacones) or by the direct 
introduction of a new currency by design.  The quasi-money that may provide a government 
with a spontaneous escape valve out of nominal fiscal rigidities in the face of a drying up in 
financing can also be turned into an opportunity for recomposing a degree of sustainable 
flexibility (to adjust the budget as well as the relative prices of tradables to non-tradables) in 
a financially dollarized emerging economy. 
 
To be sure, the introduction of a new currency by design may find political support 
only once the crisis is well underway.  Even at that stage, it is more likely that the process of 
pesification at the margin in a currency board or dollarized country would start with the 
spontaneous printing of quasi-monies.
34  However, it seems plausible that, as part of crisis 
management and resolution, once a quasi-money has emerged spontaneously—in reflection 
of nominal rigidities and under severe cash flow constraints—the authorities could shepherd 
it and eventually formalize it, at least into a currency for transactions.  The success of this 
effort would, of course, hinge on the simultaneous implementation of a comprehensive 
program with improved fiscal policies and the requisite institutional and structural reforms. 
 
In the specific case of Argentina, pesification at the margin would have been 
preceded by stock dollarization—i.e., the dollarization of all existing financial and non-
financial contracts—to stem the run and stabilize financial conditions.  Political support was 
(and still is) weak for this type of option, however, possibly due to the fact that the debate in 
Argentina and elsewhere continues to revolve around the two extreme views (stock 
                                                 
33 The discount was due more to a liquidity premium than to the associated credit risk. 
34 It is hard to conceive how the authorities of a dollarized country may have the incentives or the political 
backup to reintroduce a new local currency by design.  17
pesification cum float and plain vanilla dollarization).  At any rate, while the precise manner 
in which pesification at the margin would have been formalized after stock dollarization is a 
valid matter for debate, the basic process is somewhat of a moot point, since local currencies 
could have been easily recycled into one new national money.
35 
 
The new currency would have been part of a bi-monetary system, in the sense that its 
use would have been circumscribed, at least initially, to transaction purposes, with the dollar 
used as the store of value for savings.  The new currency would have realistically been 
externally non-convertible.  It would have fluctuated against the dollar.  Moreover, it could 
have been granted legal tender status and, possibly also, exclusivity for tax payments 
purposes, so as to consolidate its transactional demand. 
 
Pesification at the margin is certainly not a panacea, but it would no doubt be a way 
to allow a degree of flexibility in a dollarized system. Pesification at the margin through a 
new currency would provide flexibility to adjust fiscal spending to income and, as long as 
there is less than complete indexation of wages to the dollar, to correct misalignments in the 
real exchange rate (the relative price of tradables to non-tradables).
36 
 
The logic of pesification at the margin is grounded theoretically and empirically in 
the distinction between money as a means of payment and money as a store of value. Indeed, 
the money used for payments transactions needs not be the same as the money used for 
savings and to organize financial intermediation. The analysis in Ize and Parrado (2002) 
attests to such theoretical point. Empirically, the distinction is commonly observed—Perú, 
Bolivia, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Guatemala are among the countries in Latin America where 
the domestic currency is used for transactions while the dollar is the currency of 
denomination for most financial contracts. The logic is reinforced by the post-devaluation 
experience in Argentina. The legal and political obstacles that hampered the government’s 
strategy forcibly to stock pesify clearly indicate the limitations of establishing the local 
currency as store of value in a financially dollarized economy. In contrast, the transactions 
demand for the domestic currency (both for the old peso and the quasi-monies) remained 
relativelt stable even through the depths of the Argentine crisis.   
 
Pesification at the margin can become a relevant alternative for some emerging 
economies, particularly considering that financial dollarization has been a pervasive 
phenomenon in emerging markets for some time, and has been growing pari passu with 
financial globalization.
37 To the extent that it admits pesification at the margin, dollarization 
could arguably be turned into a viable alternative (if accompanied by appropriate institutional 
improvements) for some open emerging economies with highly dollarized financial systems 
that are trying to survive in the midst of increasingly globalized and volatile financial 
markets.   
                                                 
35 We deliberately abstract from the problem of an unfair wealth transfer between different issuers once 
currencies are monetized by a central bank.  Conceivably, such transfers could be undone either within the 
monetization scheme or directly through countervailing budgetary transfers.  
36 Interestingly, dollar indexation of wages is rare even in the most financially dollarized emerging economies. 
37 Financial dollarization, following Ize and Levy Yeyati (2001), denotes the holding by residents of foreign 
currency-denominated assets and liabilities.  18
 
Pesification at the margin can help mitigate the oft-seen inconsistency between 
financial structure and trade structure. That is, the inconsistency housed by countries whose 
trade and productive structure clearly argues against pegging to the dollar (see footnote 1) but 
where a long history of instability and faulty policies has led to not-easy-to-reverse financial 
dollarization. Moreover, a bi-monetary scheme (peso transactions and dollar savings) can 
also be the basis of a new design of prudential norms for dollarized financial systems—
norms that are needed to address the type of issues discussed in section 3, including the 
challenge of preserving the payments system from the financial vulnerabilities arising from 
credit risk in the non-tradable sector.
38 Pesification at the margin, however, leaves open the 
complex question of the currency of denomination for financial intermediation (particularly 
for the non-tradable sector) in the future. 
 
In sum, even under the extreme turbulence of the second half of 2001 in Argentina, 
arguments based on the need to preserve viable links between money and banking and avoid 
a run militate in favor of de jure dollarization over forcible pesification. However, absent 
other sources of flexibility, dollarization would have been eventually undermined by a 
massive issuance of provincial bonds. Accordingly, the need to generate a minimum nominal 
flexibility to undo de CGD trap would have benefited from the creation of a new, non-
convertible currency to be used as a means of payment, possibly based on the monetization 
of the small-denomination bonds that proliferated when other sources of deficit financing run 
out. The introduction of a new currency at the margin, initially for transactions, with legal 
tender privileges under the control of the Central Bank, either by design or by the 
consolidation of one or more of the existing local bonds, would have provided a much less 
disruptive way out of the rigid constraint imposed by the one-to-one rule. 
 
7. Final  remarks 
 
After the reforms following the Tequila crisis, the Argentine financial system was 
relatively strong.  The system was prepared to work well under the currency board, or under 
full dollarization, although there were some hidden weaknesses that were not acknowledged 
ex-ante through prudential norms.  
 
The procrastination in addressing the currency and debt components of the currency-
growth-debt (CGD) trap, that caught Argentina after 1998, helped precipitate a financial 
crisis.  As growth did not pick up and external credit dried up, the options to the government 
narrowed sharply and any decision became more costly.  The crisis could probably have been 
avoided or minimized with an early dollarization, provided that it was followed over time by 
the introduction of greater nominal flexibility, which could have been achieved in practice 
through pesification at the margin. 
 
The costs and benefits of dollarization should have been evaluated at least under four 
dimensions.  
                                                 
38 De la Torre, Levy Yeyati, and Schmukler (2002) discuss possible solutions to these problems, including a 
narrow banking-type financial structure or a separation of transaction and investment banks by currency of 
intermediation.  19
 
a.  Government default probability and severity   
 
The extent of default is likely to be larger under stock pesification cum float 
because tax revenues are in pesos and the real exchange rate tends to overshoot.  
 
b.  Financial system stability and functioning   
 
Dollarization would have ensured a store of value, on which financial 
intermediation hinges.  It would have removed fears of deposit freezes and stock 
pesification, making bank runs much less likely.   
 
c.  Growth   
 
Short-run growth:  By maintaining the financial intermediation function, 
dollarization would have avoided a payment system collapse (deposit freeze) and 
could have provided a short-term rebound in growth, due to return in confidence 
(as illustrated by Ecuador).  Dollarization would have provided a clear and fast 
signal on the new regime for the economy.  Stock pesification cum float, by 
contrast, takes more time to achieve credibility, since the government must gain 
reputation by building a consistent track record. 
 
Long-run growth:  Whether stock pesification cum float comes out ahead of 
dollarization depends on how much long run growth is derived from real wage 
flexibility, on the one hand, or the access to low-cost finance, on the other.  It also 
depends on how much long-run growth depends on the institutional framework 
and the non-violation of contracts.  Nominal flexibility could be increased over 
time under dollarization, mainly through pesification at the margin. But it would 
not likely reach the degree of flexibility that a well-functioning flexible exchange 
rate regime can afford.  
 
d.  Political economy   
 
Dollarization would have maintained the basic social contract that every peso was 
worth a dollar.  In that light, it was politically less difficult to dollarize than to 
stock pesify.  Stock pesification could only be done, as the experience shows, in 
the midst of a crisis and in the context of a change in government.  There were no 
incentives for any government to break the parity and freeze deposits if the 
economy was not under severe stress.  The potential long-run benefits of having a 
flexible exchange rate appear to be hardly a compensation for the huge short-run 
costs of forcible stock pesification, particularly considering that dollarization is 
not inherently in conflict with pesification at the margin.   
 
To conclude, the option to dollarize would have probably limited the costs of the 
crisis, although it would not have spared Argentina from significant adjustment costs.  In the 
end, the country needed to adjust to the new equilibrium real exchange rate.  The analysis in  20
this paper suggests that the costs of adjustment could have been lower under dollarization 
plus pesification at the margin than under stock pesification.  To the extent that the 
transactions demand for this new currency was non-zero, as the demand for many provincial 
bonds in Argentina has shown, this option would have avoided breaking all dollar-based 
domestic contracts in the economy and, with it, would have averted the collapse of the 
financial system.  At the same time, through pesification at the margin, this alternative could 
have yielded a degree of flexibility with which to adjust government spending to income as 
well as to correct the misalignment of the real exchange rate, without having to destroy 
financial intermediation in the process. 
 
Though this paper has discussed the different options available to Argentina, further 
analysis on how to exit a currency board or dollarization without a massive violation of 
property rights is warranted more generally.  Such analysis would be of particular relevance 
to emerging economies whose financial systems are highly dollarized but whose trade and 
productive structures make a dollar peg highly inconvenient. 
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Box 1.  Argentina:  Post-1994 Banking System Strengthening 
 
Effective and ambitious financial sector reforms vigorously adopted in the second half of the 1990s 
were translated in a major consolidation and internationalization of the banking system (Table 1).  The number 
of banks shrunk from 166 in 1994 to 89 in 2000.  Banks exited not just through mergers and acquisitions but 
also through bank closures.  The number of public banks decreased from 32 in 1994 to 15 in 2000, reflecting an 
aggressive privatization process of provincial banks.  The number of branches of foreign-owned banks 
increased from 391 in 1994 to 1,863 in 2000, while the share of these banks in the system’s assets rose from 15 
to 73 percent. 
 
This process was accompanied and underpinned by an acceleration in the pace of legal, regulatory, and 
supervisory innovations.  The main improvements in the regulatory and contractual environment for the 
banking system are briefly described below.   
 
1.  A quantum leap forward in a market-friendly approach to prudential oversight   
 
Much of this process was organized around the innovative BASIC program (in Spanish:  B = bonos; A 
= auditoria; S = supervision consolidada; I = información; and C = calificadoras de riesgo).  BASIC was an 
Argentine-bred approach, superimposed on internationally recognized CAMELS-based supervisory 
methodology, to enhance the complementarity between official and market monitoring.  The “B” in BASIC 
emphasized the requirement on banks to issue subordinated debt so as to generate better price signals of bank 
risk.  The “A” stood for a program to improve internal and external audits.  The “S” referred to the 
implementation of consolidated supervision of financial conglomerates.  The “I” reflected a major program to 
enhance the quality, depth, coverage, and dissemination of information—through higher reporting standards for 
financial statements, broader and easily accessible information on debtors, and more stringent information 
requirements on financial group structure and ownership.  And the “C” referred to the requirement on larger 
banks to have annual ratings by international rating firms.  Partly as a result of the implementation of the 
BASIC program, it was broadly believed that Argentina in the late 1990s was near full compliance with the 
Basle Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. 
 
Particularly noteworthy in the Argentine regulatory reform was the introduction of rigorous system of 
capital requirements, defined to absorb both credit and market risks, and significantly more stringent that the 
Basle minimum standard.  The system featured various components.  One component was minimum capital 
requirement for credit risk of 11.5 percent of risk-weighted loan exposures to the private sector, with variable 
weights within each loan class depending on the risk of individual loans, as measured by the interest rate 
charged on the loan.  This ratio, moreover, was augmented by a factor for banks receiving lower CAMEL 
ratings.  In addition, during 2000, positive risk weights were introduced for loans to the government and mark 
to market requirements were introduced for holdings of government bonds.  Finally, capital requirements were 
set separately to absorb unexpected fluctuations in interest rates and in the prices of private sector securities.  
 
Also noteworthy were the stringent liquidity requirements, high by international standards, and 
intended to work counter-cyclically—i.e., to be tightened during buoyant times and relaxed during times of 
systemic liquidity squeeze.  By 1998, most deposits (those with maturities of less than 90 days) required a 20 
percent (remunerated) reserve. 
 
2.  A “best practice” scheme for troubled bank resolution 
 
After the Tequila, Argentina introduced key institutional innovations to enhance the bank exit 
framework, including Art. 35bis of the banking law—which created an efficient system for bank closure and 
resolution—and a privately managed limited deposit insurance scheme (SEDESA). This framework greatly 
contributed the consolidation of the banking system through the exit of unviable banks.  Argentina became a  24
salient case in the region where unviable banks (and not just small ones) were actually closed—between 1995 
and 2000 about 20 banks were closed using the powers of Article 35bis.
39 
 
3.  Privatization of provincial banks   
 
Between 1994 and 1998, 16 provincial banks were privatized within a process that, though not perfect, 
was among the most aggressive and successful in the region.
40 
 
4.  Contingent repo facility   
 
This was an over-collateralized facility, structured in order to partially compensate for the virtual lack 
of a domestic lender of last resort and to strengthen the banking system’s capacity to weather a liquidity crisis.  
The facility gave the BCRA the option to sell dollar-denominated Argentine government bonds to a consortium 
of reputable international banks, subject to a buy-back clause (with an embedded implicit interest rate).  In 
1999, the World Bank reinforced this facility by committing contingent funds to help meet margin calls in the 
event it was activated.  By the end of the 1990s, the contingent repo line ensured the liquidity of about 10 
percent of the system’s deposits, in addition to the equivalent of nearly 20 percent of deposits already held in 
the form of liquid and safe FX assets (dollar cash and near-cash in the central bank and commercial banks).  
 
5.  Improvements in the framework for creditor rights and corporate insolvency   
 
In 1995, Argentina enacted a new modern insolvency law that fostered a substantially improved 
system of corporate liquidation and rehabilitation.  Similarly important reforms were implemented to improve 
the enforcement of secured and unsecured creditor rights.  The World Bank assessment of Argentina’s degree of 
compliance with international standards on insolvency and creditor rights found that, if one ignores the changes 
introduced most recently (in March 2002), the “permanent” framework for corporate insolvency and creditors 
rights is “largely consistent with the Principles.” 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 For further details see De la Torre (2000). 
40 A thorough assessment of the process and results of provincial bank privatization in Argentina can be found 
in World Bank (1999).  25
 
 
Box 2.  Argentina’s Via Crucis 
 
-  President De la Rúa takes power in December 1999 when the country is already in recession and the public 
debt has reached high levels. 
-  The government tries to gain confidence, and thus restore growth, through fiscal adjustment. 
-  The “impuestazo” is implemented in January 2000.  The new tax scheme includes, among other things, an 
increase in the taxation on consumer goods, an extension of VAT to health insurance and transportation, and 
an extension of the income tax base. 
-    The fiscal adjustment does not bring growth.  Rather, the recession deepens and doubts about debt 
sustainability increase dramatically. 
-   The political weakness of the De la Rúa’s administration becomes evident when vice president Carlos 
Alvarez resigns in October 2000.  
-   In December 2000, Minister Machinea negotiates a US$40 billion package with international financial 
institutions and domestic financial institutions to extend the public debt maturity and try to ease fears of 
default.  The deal implied a much lower amount of fresh funds, around US$12 billion. 
-  The government’s bet is that once these fears were eased, growth would resume, but growth does not pick up 
and Mr. Machinea resigns in March 2001. 
-   The newly appointed economy minister Lopez Murphy resigns after two weeks in office, upon strong 
opposition to the new fiscal austerity package he sent to Congress on March 16.  
-  Mr. Cavallo becomes economy minister once more.  He is empowered by Congress with special powers and 
tries different, more direct, measures to revive growth.  On April 16, 2001, he proposes to congress an 
amendment to the convertibility law, according to which the peso would be pegged to a basket consisting of 
US dollars and euros with equal weights, when the dollar-euro rate reaches 1:1.  Congress approves the 
amendment in mid-June 2001.  This change aims at better aligning the peso more with Argentina’s trading 
partners. 
-  On April 25, 2001, the president of the central bank, Mr. Pedro Pou, resigns amid disagreements with Mr. 
Cavallo and other members of the government.  Mr. Roque Maccarone replaces Mr. Pou.  
-  On July 10, 2001, the government, after being forced to pay 1,410 basis points over US Treasuries to place a 
short-term bond, announces a “zero deficit” rule. 
-  It thus becomes obvious that the government cannot tap capital markets without the debt exploding. 
-  To implement the zero deficit rule, the government pushes hard for an IMF-supported program.  But to obtain 
it, the government needed an agreement with the provinces on tax revenue sharing. 
-   Mr. John Taylor, US Treasury under secretary, declares that there would not be any external help for 
Argentina until it can comply with its objective of a zero deficit.  
-  On October 26, 2001, the negotiations toward an agreement with the provinces on the distribution of tax 
revenues fail (again).  
-  On October 28, 2001, minister Cavallo starts negotiations to obtain resources from the IMF and the US 
Treasury to purchase collateral for new bonds to be issued in an exchange for the nearly US$100 billion of 
local and external debt. 
-  On October 29, 2001, Mr. Cavallo defines the debt exchange operation as voluntary.  The old debt would 
exchange for bonds paying seven percent per year and guarantee by taxes revenues. However, the IMF and 
US Treasury ask for compliance with the zero deficit and an agreement with the provinces on the tax revenue 
sharing before any kind of financial support is given. The negotiations last for more than a month.  
-  On November 19, 2001, the IMF announces that it would not make any new disbursements to Argentina 
without being satisfied that the country has secured the goals previously defined.  
-  On December 2, 2001, the government announces measures restricting deposit withdrawals (the corralito).  
Withdrawals are limited to 250 pesos (dollars) per week per account.  
-  On December 19, 2001, Mr. Cavallo and all other ministers resigned.  
-  On December 20, 2001, President De la Rúa resigns and Mr. Ramon Puerta becomes interim president.  
-  On December 23, 2001, Mr. Rodriguez Saa, governor of one of the provinces, becomes the new interim 
president.  His period is supposed to last 60 days, until elections are called on March 3, 2002. He declares the 
suspension of external debt payments for at least 60 days.   26
-  On December 24, 2001, the government announces that a new fiat currency (i.e., without foreign-currency 
backing) would be created, the “argentino.” 
-   On December 30, 2001, Mr. Rodriguez Saa resigns and the legislative assembly chooses Mr. Eduardo 
Duhalde as new president. He assumes power on January 2, 2002, and officially ends the currency board and 
announces the floating of the peso. 
 1994  1998 2000
Number of total banks 166                104                89                 
Foreign banks
    Number of banks 31                  39                  39                 
    Number of branches 391                1,535             1,863            
    Share of total assets (%) 15                  55                  73                 
Number of public banks 32                  16                  15                 
Source: Central Bank of Argentina
Table 1
Figures correspond to end-of-year values.
 Consolidation and Internationalization of Argentina's Banking SystemCountry Total Score*
Singapore 16
Argentina 21
Hong Kong 21
Chile 25
Brazil 30
Peru 35
Malaysia 41
Colombia 44
Korea 45
Philippines 47
Thailand 52
Indonesia 52
Table 2
CAMELOT Ratings for Banking System Regulation
*Lower numbers indicate better ranking.
Source: World Bank, Argentina Financial Sector Review, 19981997 1998 1999 2000
Net Worth/Assets 12.1 11.4 10.7 10.5
Capital / Risk Weighted Assets 18.1 17.6 18.6 21.2
Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans (a) 8.2 6.0 7.1 10.2
Provisions/Total Loans 7.7 7.1 7.8 8.7
Provisions/Non-Performing Loans (a) 108.6 140.4 122.3 77.1
Systemic Core Liquidity (b)  43.0 39.6 40.9 38.7
Return on Equity before Provisions 22.6 10.6 8.4 7.8
Return on Equity after Provisions 7.4 -2.2 -6.7 -9.4
Return on Assets after Provisions 1.0 -0.3 -0.8 -1.0
Leverage Ratio (not in precent) 6.1 7.3 7.7 8.3
Source: Central Bank of Argentina
Table 3
(a) Non-performing loans is defined as the sum of loans with problems, loans with high risk and non-recoverable loans.
(b) Defined as the ratio of international reserves of the central bank in foreign currency and other liquidity requirements held 
abroad by banks to total deposits.
Selected Banking System Indicators in Argentina
Percentages at end of yearDenomination December 2001 March 2002
a. Federal government Lecop 1,039                            2,649                    
b. Provincial "own" securities 1,627                            2,591                    
1. Buenos Aires Patacones 822                               1,591                    
2. Buenos Aires, City Porteno -                                -                       
3. Catamarca Ley 4748 26                                 31                         
4. Chaco Quebracho 50                                 100                       
5. Cordoba Lecor 200                               300                       
6. Corrientes Cecaror 193                               185                       
7. Entre Rios Bonfe 54                                 148                       
8. Formosa Bocanfor 33                                 50                         
9. Jujuy Patacon -                                6                           
10. Mendoza Petrom -                                -                       
11. La Rioja Debt Cancelation 8                                   8                           
12. Tucuman Bocade 98                                 173                       
Total quasi-monies (a+b) 2,666                            5,240                    
As percentage of pesos in circulation
Total quasi-monies 23.2                              45.6                      
Table 4
(Millions of Argentine pesos)
Source: Ministry of Economy, Argentina
Argentina's Quasi-Monies in CirculationFigure 1
The offshore currency premia as measured by Schmukler and Serven (2001), was calculated with the 1-month non-deliverable forward (NDF) discount, the forward 
exchange rate minus the spot exchange rate.
All rates are in basis points, annualized, and continuously compounded. 
Sources: JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank, and Bloomberg
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